

The Republican Interpretation: Retrospect and Prospect

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TWENTY YEARS ago, when *The Creation of the American Republic* had just come off the press and I was still researching my doctoral dissertation, none of us had heard of a 'republican interpretation' of the Revolution. As late as 1978, unless I misremember, I did not employ this term or any of its cognates in *The Jeffersonian Persuasion*, although the dissertation from which that book derived was finished just as Robert Shalhope was describing the emergence of a 'republican synthesis' and calling for a reinterpretation of the new republic in its terms.¹ Modern scholarship develops with astounding speed. By 1982, when Shalhope's second article appeared, the republican hypothesis had been extended well into the nineteenth century; and it had exercised sufficient influence through the past ten years that it had also come to be a target for a great variety of critics.² If it had ever been a synthesis, it seemed to be a synthesis no more. Indeed, at least to the extent that the republican interpretation had been pushed beyond the ratification of the Constitution, there were signs of growing influence for a criticism which, I thought, was leading readers to mistake its contents and neglect its most important

1. Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1969); Lance Banning, *The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); Robert Shalhope, 'Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 29 (1972): 49-80.

2. Shalhope, 'Republicanism and Early American Historiography,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 39 (1982): 334-56.

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contributions.³ At that point, I entered the notorious debate about the influence of 'republican' and 'liberal' ideas.⁴

If subsequent citations are a guide, I probably accomplished only part—and, from today's perspective, maybe not the most important part—of what I aimed at in the article of 1986. My controversy with Joyce Appleby had two dimensions. At the simpler level, I believed that she had seriously misrepresented much of what some useful writings had in fact maintained about the Jeffersonian Republicans and their opponents. It was also my impression—from citations, conversations, and the like—that many readers were collecting their impression of republican interpretations not from careful reading of the major works themselves but from misleading summaries by others. (If there is anything, in fact, that tends to disillusion me about our business, this would surely be the great degree to which our universal struggle to remain abreast of an exploding literature is leading to a huge amount of careless reading or to even poorer strategies for keeping up.) Thus, 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited' was prompted partly by a wish to set the record straight and by a hope that readers might be driven back to works which it defended for a closer look at what their authors really had to say.

Throughout the early 1980s, I had been preoccupied primarily with Madison (and, more especially, with the development of Madison's ideas *before* the framing of the Constitution). Still, the argument with Appleby was not intended simply as a rear-guard action. At another level, I attempted—much as Gordon Wood has tried in several recent pieces—to suggest that arguments about the relative importance of republican and liberal ideas were not the

3. Joyce Appleby, 'Commercial Farming and the "Agrarian Myth" in the Early Republic,' *Journal of American History* 68 (1982): 833–49, 'What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson?' *William and Mary Quarterly* 39 (1982): 287–309, and *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s* (New York, 1984); Isaac Kramnick, 'Republican Revisionism Revisited,' *American Historical Review* 87 (1982): 629–64; John Patrick Diggins, *The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism* (New York, 1985).

4. 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986): 3–19.

most productive way to study the Revolutionary era.⁵ Most such arguments, it seemed to me, were misconceived. They certainly seemed misconceived to the degree that scholars had forgotten that these two distinguishable traditions came into the English-speaking world together—and as allies, for the most part, rather than as foes. At some point in the nineteenth century, it may be true, American ideas and values came to be predominantly liberal and democratic; the republican concerns that had been vital to the Revolutionary generation came to be significantly overshadowed. When and how this happened—and to what degree—are questions that continue to be near the top of our research agenda. But the answers, I suggested—and I still believe—should not begin by posing an eighteenth-century war between competing classical and modern paradigms, which ended when the liberal standard swept its rival from the field. An image of this sort may hold some stirring narrative potential, but eighteenth-century people did not think that way. They blended and combined two trains of thinking that are separable for analytical objectives of our own, but usually were mixed when eighteenth-century people thought about their current problems. Accordingly, I argued that it might be better to examine the development of this distinctive combination of ideas than to imagine a dispute between its parts. Indeed, I really thought that this is what most scholars had been doing when Appleby and others mounted their critiques. The republican hypothesis, as I had always understood it, had never been intended to deny a central role in Revolutionary thinking for liberal ideas—not, at least, if ‘liberal’ means a democratic, individualistic, and contractual conception of the origins and limits of governmental power. Rather, the republican hypothesis had always seemed to me to be an argument that Lockean or liberal ideas were only part of an inheritance, a context, or a universe of thought which could

5. See, for example, ‘Illusions and Disillusions in the American Revolution,’ in Jack P. Greene, ed., *The American Revolution: Its Character and Limits* (New York, 1987), 358–61, together with the response to critics of *The Creation of the American Republic* cited in note 25 below.

be better understood by recognizing that it was a great deal more complex than earlier interpretations had suggested.

Here, perhaps, is where the article of 1986 was less successful. Several readers, certainly, considered it a different sort of statement than I meant to make, though sometimes for contrasting reasons.⁶ Allow me, then, to make another stab at this dimension of the argument and at the ways that I have tried to build on it since then. For this, it seems to me, may still be relevant as scholars seem to be achieving something like a general agreement that a multiplicity of 'paradigms' or ideational traditions were at work throughout the Revolutionary age.⁷

What is the republican hypothesis most fundamentally *about*? What, if any, are the central and enduring contributions of the 'synthesis' that Shalhope named? In my conception, terms like these are handy labels for an effort that began while I was still in college to rewrite our history to take advantage of the rediscovery of certain strands in Revolutionary thinking which were largely lost to national memory (and even to historical scholarship) for perhaps a century's time: ways of thinking which could be explained as products of the influence of a set of eighteenth-century British writers who had been essentially ignored until the later 1950s.⁸ These eighteenth-century opposition writers, to employ a neutral term, were never of a single mind. Their early students

6. Thus Thomas Pangle (*The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke* [Chicago, 1988], 285) read it as a waffling, obfuscating, and apologetic retraction of my earlier position, while James T. Kloppenberg ('The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,' *Journal of American History* 74 [1987]: 28, note 27) saw it as excessively contentious and unyielding.

7. In addition to Kloppenberg, 'The Virtues of Liberalism,' see Forrest McDonald, *Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan., 1985); Kramnick, 'The "Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 45 (1988): 3-32; and the letters of Kramnick and J. G. A. Pocock in *ibid.*, 817-18.

8. Four publications were especially influential in initiating the recovery of this tradition: Clinton Rossiter, *Seedtime of the Republic: The Origin of the American Tradition of Political Liberty* (New York, 1953); Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealthman* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); the second edition of Z. S. Fink, *The Classical Republicans* (Evanston, Ill., 1962); and J. G. A. Pocock, 'Machiavelli, Harrington, and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 22 (1965): 549-83.

called them by a wide variety of names: Commonwealthmen, Old Whigs, Real Whigs, or Country critics of the Court. But whether they were Whigs or Tories, it appeared, the most distinctive feature of their thought was their continuing concern with values and ideas that could be traced to a revival of a classical defense of mixed republics. Reformulated in an English manner by the seventeenth-century opponents and supporters of the ancient constitution, neoclassical conceptions seemed to have been built upon by opposition writers to construct a sweeping and persistent condemnation of the eighteenth-century system of administration and finance. In tribute to their lineage—for reasons that seemed proper at the time—scholars soon became accustomed to referring to the opposition's values and concerns as 'classical republican' in nature (or 'civic humanist' in Pocock's monumental history of their development and influence).⁹

'Classical republican,' it now appears, would prove a problem-laden term for the tradition the enduring influence of which scholars set about to trace. I will say more on this below. First, however, it is useful to recall that, at the start, the striking feature of the eighteenth-century opposition writings seemed to be their constant warnings that the balanced constitution, which supported British freedom, was increasingly endangered by the rise of standing armies, high taxation, governmental influence, and a funded debt. Emphasizing the polarities of liberty and power, independence and dependence, virtue and corruption, the militia and a standing army, opposition condemnations of the eighteenth-century system formed a long and powerful tradition. For something like a hundred years, a condemnation of a ministerial conspiracy to undermine the nation's freedom served as a consistent, necessary strategy for reconciling a persistent opposition to the government in power with a deep commitment to the mixed and balanced constitution. The republican interpretation (as it would be named by Shalhope) was, in its beginnings, nothing more—and nothing

9. J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, 1975).

less—than the attempt to fit this ‘classical-republican’ or ‘civic-humanist’ or ‘British opposition’ thinking back into our understanding of the eighteenth-century story.

Crudely speaking, a revised interpretation on these lines exploded into prominence with Bernard Bailyn’s powerful analysis of the essential role of these ideas in the decisions for American independence and a republican Revolution.¹⁰ It developed, in a manner I need not review, through Wood’s outstanding history of constitutional and cultural developments to 1789 and on into attempts to reach a better understanding of political divisions in the new republic. In the aftermath of Pocock’s mammoth work, the lasting influence of these civic humanist concerns became a major theme for nineteenth-century studies. Meanwhile, since it seemed apparent that republican ideas affected nearly every facet of the culture, the republican interpretation was developed in enlarging circles to rewrite our views of nearly every aspect of the Revolutionary age. These enlarging circles, as I understand it, were a major reason for Shalhope’s early references to its synthetic potential. They are a major reason, too, for many of our current arguments, misunderstandings, and mistakes.

Which are which, as I conceive it? Can we separate the contributions from the errors and misunderstandings? Can a retrospect identify some faulty turnings in the work thus far, reduce confusions, and suggest some paths that might lead out of current thickets? I believe it can, and that the prospects will be best if we recur to the first, good principles with which the enterprise began.

The starting point and permanent foundation for republican interpretations is the argument that ways of thinking which derived from British opposition writers were of critical importance to the Revolutionary generation, which transmitted them to their posterity in turn, so that a recognition of their influence demands a significant rewriting of American history since that time. This argument, thus stated, does not need additional defense. When

10. Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967).

the republican hypothesis is phrased in some such terms, its contributions seem apparent and secure. At present, there are few dissenters from the view that Revolutionary history cannot be written well without according an essential place to the ideas that Pocock, Bailyn, Wood, and others called to our attention. Every year—and almost every month—brings further studies showing that republican concerns continued to exert substantial influence far into the future. From this perspective, the republican interpretation has achieved its principal objectives and continues to expand. Most of those who pioneered it could, quite fairly, simply claim a triumph on these grounds and keep repeating that they cannot help it if their critics and supporters have insisted on defining their objectives in different, more ambitious terms.

This last remark may seem outrageous in the face of sharp, continuing disputes; and yet it may prove useful to descend a moment from the heights of theoretical disputes and look a bit more closely at the ground. Certainly, it neither derogates from the achievements of revisionary work nor minimizes the legitimate objections of its critics to suggest that both the objects and the claims of most of the original proponents of republican interpretations were by no means as exclusivist as many of their critics and admirers have supposed. One fundamental problem for a major new interpretation is that it may soon acquire a superstructure grander than it can support and different, in important ways, from what its early architects may have intended.

The republican interpretation, in its current form, is not identical with books and articles that I consider central to its structure and creation. The 'synthesis,' as it is often called, extends to how these writings have been lumped together, built upon, extended, summarized, and criticized by others—not infrequently in ways that have been most discomforting to authors who are commonly associated with the things for which the synthesis is now supposed to stand.¹¹ Many current criticisms of republican interpretations

11. As Linda Kerber put it: 'thanks to Shalhope a collection of rather disparate historians have discovered that they were part of a school'; and 'as republicanism has widened greatly

do not start with what is really in its major statements but with what those statements have been taken to imply by both extenders and opponents. Recognizing this could surely help resolve some lingering misunderstandings.

These comments, to my mind, can clearly be applied to much, although by no means all, of the extended controversy over liberal and classical ideas. Almost from the start, the advocates of a republican interpretation were accused of claiming far too much. Denouncing an assumption that the reasoning of highly literate elites was shared at other levels of the population, some historians objected from the start to the consensual implications of the new interpretation.¹² Later, others argued that the theoretical assumptions of the ideological historians were seriously flawed, leaving insufficient room for intellectual innovation or for thinking which did not derive from a republican tradition.¹³

Both of these objections merit serious attention. Advocates of the republican interpretation did involve themselves in one or both of these two pitfalls to a large or small degree. Few of them, however, actually committed many of the other errors with which they are often charged. On this matter, for example, I, for one, have sometimes thought of modifying a distateful affirmation: I do not now, nor did I ever, think of the republican tradition as a rival or alternative to a Lockean or liberal conception of the origins and limits of political society. Indeed, I do not think that any of the major architects of the republican interpretation ever claimed

in usage it is in danger of coming to signify too much and therefore to mean too little' ('The Republican Ideology of the Revolutionary Generation,' *American Quarterly* 37 [1985]: 474, 480).

12. Shalhope, 'Republicanism and Early American Historiography,' is a good review of early neo-progressive and new-left criticisms.

13. The best discussions of the theoretical underpinnings of the new ideological history and of the deterministic pitfalls present in the social-science theories by which it was influenced are in three essays by Joyce Appleby: 'Value and Society,' in Jack P. Greene and J. R. Pole, eds., *Colonial British America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern Era* (Baltimore, 1984), 290-316; 'Republicanism and Ideology,' *American Quarterly* 37 (1985), 461-73; and 'Republicanism in Old and New Contexts,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 43 (1986): 20-34. See also Ralph Lerner, 'The Constitution of the Thinking Revolutionary,' in Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter III, eds., *Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1987), 38-68.

that revolutionary thinking could be fully understood without regard to Locke and other early modern theorists of natural rights and social compacts.¹⁴ Neither do I think that any of them ever argued that republican ideas and values exercised a *greater* influence on the course of subsequent developments than liberal or democratic concepts.¹⁵

The republican interpretation, to my mind, has always been opposed to older, liberal interpretations only in so far as it insists that there is much about the Revolution and the new American Republic that cannot be understood without a comprehension of the vital role of neoclassical or civic humanist ideas—and, thus, that the American political tradition did not start with and may never have achieved a merely liberal consensus.¹⁶ The republican interpretation is inimical to an insistence on the influence of a liberal tradition only in so far as liberal interpretations have suggested that, from the beginning of the national republic, most Americans adhered to the opinion that the public good requires no more than that the state respect the rights of all and individuals attend to little more than improving their private lives and voting their distinctive interests—only in so far as ‘liberalism’ has been recently defined as an unqualified acceptance of acquisitive behavior, ‘a whole-hearted ideology of the market,’ redefinition of man as ‘*homo oeconomicus*’ rather than as ‘*homo civicus*,’ or un-

14. Pocock, in particular, has frequently been charged with making this assertion and seems to me the only major figure against whom the indictment might be made with any plausibility at all. But *The Machiavellian Moment* explicitly says that ‘the deemphasizing of Locke is for the present a tactical necessity. The historical context must be reconstructed without him before he can be fitted back into it’ (p. 424; see also p. 516).

15. Here, also, it is usually *The Machiavellian Moment* which is read this way. I simply do not see why. Forty-six of the 552 pages of this book are devoted to the American experience, the great majority of those to the Revolutionary and Early National periods. The relatively brief reflections on the subsequent course of American history certainly maintain that ‘even in America, the republic faces the problem of its own ultimate finitude . . . in space and time,’ and thus that there is ‘a dimension of historical pessimism in American thought at its most utopian, which stems from the confrontation of virtue and commerce’ (541). But to assert the lasting influence of this mode of thought is not to claim that it alone is of substantial interest.

16. Thus, the standard target for the advocates of the republican tradition has been Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution* (New York, 1955).

equivocal support of an emerging commercial, industrial, and capitalistic order.¹⁷

Saying this, of course, is far from saying that the Revolution started from a strictly classical *and not* a modern-liberal tradition. No one, on my reading, ever made this claim. In fact, from its beginnings, the republican interpretation was, in one of its most striking aspects, an attempt to understand the great transition from an early modern to a fully modern culture, to explain the revolutionary features of the Revolution. Wood and Bailyn, as I understand them, both attributed a central role in this transition to the influence of a democratic, individualistic, natural-rights philosophy; and new interpretations of the new republic were consistently concerned, from the beginning, with the further transformation of the revolutionaries' universe of thought, not simply with the later influence of the old ideas.

This eighteenth-century universe, as I conceived it in *The Jeffersonian Persuasion*, had accustomed men to move immediately, without a consciousness of contradiction, from the concepts of a contractual origin of government and inherent individual rights to the assertions that a balanced form of government *and* sufficient virtue to preserve that form are necessary guarantees of freedom. The object of that book (and of related studies of the new republic) was by no means to deny the modern-liberal dimensions of the party's thought. It was to argue that the early party conflict could be better understood by recognizing that the founding generation had inherited a richer constellation of concerns which even the adoption of the Constitution did not rapidly or totally transform. In recent writings, I have tried to make this more explicit by suggesting that articulate Americans were liberal republicans by the beginning of the Revolution and continued to be liberal republicans until a time that I would hesitate to mark, perhaps because that time has never yet expired.¹⁸

17. The quotations are from Kramnick, 'Republican Revisionism Revisited,' pp. 661-62. The sentence also incorporates my understanding of Appleby's thesis concerning the Jeffersonian Republicans.

18. See 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary Thinking,'

'Liberal republicans,' of course, is not a term that anyone was using back in 1978. In using it in recent writings, I am trying to incorporate the teachings of the leading critics of republican interpretations, to correct exaggerations and mistakes, to comment on the current state of understanding, and—for present purposes, especially—to offer some suggestions as to new directions for research. Given time and patience, I would not have competence or space to systematically consider all of the misunderstandings that republican interpretations have unleashed. These, in any case, are not the only problems. Therefore, in the space remaining, I will turn instead to some of the important misconceptions which, in my opinion, may in fact be traced to what is really in the most important works. The first requirement, if we are to get beyond the current smog, is to reduce emissions rising from misreadings. The next, however, is a critical, yet sympathetic, reconsideration of the fundamentals of the new interpretation on the chance that they might be improved. This seems to me essential if we are to take advantage of the criticisms of the 1980s and, without reverting to a pre-republican interpretation, work toward a revision that may more and more approach a valid formulation.

First, accordingly, it may be well to say again that early advocates of the republican interpretation did commit mistakes. In practice, as I see it, most of them avoided the deterministic trap to which their borrowings from social-science theory did expose them. But most of them were guilty of incautious language. In the manner of revisionists—emphasizing new materials and stressing their departures from prevailing views—most were less explicit than they might have been about received opinions they did not dispute.¹⁹ This writer on the new republic, for example, probably did overemphasize the similarities between the Jeffersonians and

in Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds., *Conceptual Change and the Constitution* (Lawrence, Kan., 1988), 194–212; 'Quid Transit? Paradigms and Process in the Transformation of Republican Ideas,' *Reviews in American History* 17 (1989): 199–204; and my review of Steven Watts, *The Republic Reborn*, in *Georgia Historical Quarterly* 42 (1988): 349–50.

19. These points are elaborated in 'Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited.'

eighteenth-century British oppositions. He may thus have inadvertently exaggerated 'classical' at the expense of 'liberal' dimensions of their thought, largely by assuming that the latter had received sufficient emphasis in the existing studies. He may thus have left an overall impression that the Jeffersonians were less progressive than was actually the case. This seemed to me a valid ground for critical objections, and errors of this sort did probably contribute to some subsequent misunderstandings.²⁰

Second, it is well to note the large (and sometimes curious) misunderstandings which have followed from repeated references to 'classical republican' ideas.²¹ As first applied by Z. S. Fink and others, this expression seemed entirely proper. It referred to the revival of the ancient theory that a governmental mixture of the powers of the one, the many, and the few could break the never-ending cycle of decay and revolution. It referred, more broadly, to a train of thinking about citizenship and the polity which could be traced back through the Renaissance to Graeco-Roman writers. Some such term would still seem necessary to distinguish a tradition emphasizing freedom *to* participate with others in an active public life from a tradition emphasizing freedom *from* encroachments on pre-governmental rights.²² These two traditions, usually identified as classical and modern, *do* begin with different assump-

20. This repetition of points from the article of 1986 may be even more subject to misunderstanding than the article as a whole. Let me add, then, that I do not see them as a flight from the position of *The Jeffersonian Persuasion*. Apart from terminology that I would not employ today, the largest problem with that book now seems to me a title which is more pretentious than the contents. Larger errors of the sort that Appleby and Lerner have discussed were made in my earlier article, 'Jeffersonian Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 31 (1974): 167-88.

21. The same, of course, might well be said of references to 'liberal' ideas. As Wood has noted, 'liberalism,' unlike 'republicanism,' was not a term employed during the revolutionary era; and current usage varies greatly from scholar to scholar. For example, when I write of 'liberal republicans,' I mean to stress both words and to associate the former with a modern philosophy of inherent individual rights. In counterrevolutionary literature, however, 'liberal' is often used, in addition, to refer to an ethos of possessive individualism, a bourgeois mentality, an acquisitive, materialistic, self-centered pattern of behavior, and the like. The terminology has come to be so muddled that it makes contemporary sense to write of a republican ethic in a liberal society.

22. I am influenced in this language by Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1963) and J. H. Hexter, 'Republic, Virtue, Liberty, and the Political Universe of J. G. A. Pocock,' in *On Historians* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), pp. 255-303.

tions about human nature. They may be traced to different thinkers. Logically, if not historically, they seem to us to clash, and it is therefore necessary to explore the contradictions, tensions, and confusions in the thought of those who seem to have identified with both traditions. Thus, the argument about the influence of the two traditions has improved our understanding and will certainly continue.

On the other hand, some aspects of this argument have long been fruitless; and, in part, this is because we have been tripping over terms. In the beginning, scholars who defined the 'classical republican' tradition were specific as to what they meant. Pocock's vastly influential study, for example, was intensively concerned to understand how Graeco-Roman thought was *modified* by Florentine and English thinkers, *further* modified by eighteenth-century writers, and reconstructed even more completely during the American Revolution. Similarly, none of the American historians who played a central role in the construction of the republican synthesis ever believed or said that Revolutionary thought was *literally* classical in nature. Over time, however, as the synthesis was widened, some of the initial clarity was lost. Popularizers used the term more loosely, critics took it to imply a great deal more than had been said, and several of the masterworks of the interpretation came to be condemned by critics who had poorly understood them.

In the meantime, miscommunication was compounded as the argument assumed an interdisciplinary aspect, for references to 'classical' ideas quite often held a different set of implications for scholars trained in political theory than they did for the American historians who used the term as shorthand for a constellation of ideas which they were perfectly aware was only distantly derived from Graeco-Roman sources. In themselves, in other words, loose references to 'classical' ideas encouraged an impression that historians were saying that the thinking of the Revolutionary generation was classical *instead* of modern (in the sense that 'modern' ordinarily suggests to political theorists). For the most part, the

historians were saying no such thing, and reams of paper have been wasted in condemning books for what they never said or in rebuttals by their authors.²³

None of this, I should not have to add, should be construed to mean that all of these debates have been without foundation or that theorists have not contributed importantly to better understanding.²⁴ Defining the republican hypothesis as I have sketched it in this essay, I am as committed to it now as when *The Jeffersonian Persuasion* was completed—maybe even more. But this is not to say that I agree with everything that has been claimed for the republican interpretation. It does not prevent me from incorporating insights by its critics. It does not suggest that I believe that even the outstanding masterworks of the republican interpretation—Bailyn's, Wood's, and Pocock's—are without substantial oversights or errors. These masterworks cannot be fairly charged, on careful reading, with many of the flaws that they are often thought to hold. Above all, in my view, they cannot be persuasively accused of arguing that Revolutionary thought was classical instead of modern.

Nevertheless, it *was* the neoclassical and not the modern-liberal influence which the pioneers of the republican interpretation set about to trace, assuming that the liberal influence was already

23. An early example was Gary J. Schmitt and Robert H. Webking, 'Revolutionaries, Antifederalists, and Federalists: Comments on Gordon Wood's Understanding of the American Founding,' *Political Science Reviewer* 9 (1979): 195-229. But consider, more recently, Pangle's unrestrained attack on 'classical-republican' interpretations in chap. 4 of *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism*, especially his bitter condemnation of Drew R. McCoy's *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980). This condemnation is succeeded by a chapter (9) in which Pangle seems to me in close agreement with McCoy's essential points. Pangle's fundamental animus, I think, is more against his view of what he thinks a reference to *classical* republicanism must or should imply than against what really has been said about the new republic. McCoy and other American historians have assumed that it is less important to be clear about the philosophical position of the ancients or the nature of the ancient polis than to understand what Revolutionaries made of ancient history and sources.

24. See, for example, the superb early discussion of the differences between Pocock's civic humanists and truly classical opinions in Jean Yarbrough, 'Republicanism Reconsidered: Some Thoughts on the Foundation and Preservation of the American Republic,' *Review of Politics* 41 (1979): 61-95. Excellent for recent contributions by political theorists is Peter S. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 45(1989): 341-75.

quite well known. And for this very reason, oversights and errors did indeed get built into the very framework of republican revisions: misconceptions often present to this day whenever we discuss the 'classical-republican' components of the early Revolution. Even Wood and Pocock are imperfect; and, as imperfections really present in their work have been extended, summarized, and criticized by others, difficulties have become quite deeply seated. A third necessity for further progress, then, is to identify these imperfections and revise our image of the early Revolution in a way that might contribute to a better understanding of the Revolution's later years. This is where the 'liberal' counterpoint to the republican interpretation seems to me most useful. It is where the cracks in the republican interpretation seem most likely to encourage new mistakes.

Two difficulties need particular attention. Present from the origins of the republican interpretation, they combine to help create an image of the early Revolution not as literally classical in its intentions but at least as more decidedly pre-modern than was actually the case, and such an image has some major implications for the current state of scholarship about the founding and the new republic. On the one hand, atavistic concepts of the early Revolution lend a specious plausibility to arguments that Federalist ideas (or even Revolutionary thought in general) are better understood as wholly liberal or modern: comprehensible, that is, without significant attention to a neo-classical or humanistic interest in participatory public life, without a serious consideration of the Revolutionaries' fear of rapid and intensive economic change. This Whiggish argument, I think, suggests an earlier and easier American adjustment to modernity than actually occurred and tends to reimpovertish our understanding. The opposite mistake is also being fostered by interpretations that describe the early Revolution as more decidedly pre-modern than it was. For if we see the early Revolution as decidedly pre-modern, we may also be inclined to squeeze the great transition toward a fully modern way into too brief a time, calling on developments that stretched through many decades to explain the changes of the hour.

The Creation of the American Republic, most American historians agree, is the essential starting point for current understandings of the years from 1776 through 1787. For twenty years, this modern classic has been unsurpassed as an analysis of the development of constitutional ideas between the Declaration and the launching of the federal republic. Through these years, in my opinion, Wood's interpretation of the evolution of the Constitution has successfully withstood the greater portion of his critics. Wrapped around this central narrative, however, is a broader study of the transformation of American political culture: the movement from a 'Whig science of politics' toward 'the end of classical politics' as eighteenth-century anglophones had once conceived them. Even here, in my opinion, Wood is nearer right than wrong; and yet this larger study is significantly more problematic.²⁵ While Wood himself is far more subtle than his followers have been, the book can easily be taken to suggest that early Revolutionary talk of 'virtue' was more literally classical (more Montesquieuan or Rousseauan, I have said) than it ever really was — and thus that Madison and other Federalists broke more decisively with early Revolutionary thinking than, in fact, they really did.²⁶

A thorough recapitulation of this argument need not be offered in this place. But at the risk of oversimplifying, I can state its central points. 'Virtue,' it submits, was not a less important concept for the Revolutionaries than this masterwork suggests. And yet, perhaps because Wood tended to abstract the early Revolutionaries' fear of power and corruption from their general commitment to a balanced constitution, insufficient heed was paid to their assumption that it is impossible, in theory or in practice, to dissociate men's conduct from their interests. Revolutionary thinkers (and their eighteenth-century sources) knew that citizens would

25. Most of these remarks are in accord with several of the commentaries in the helpful forum on this modern classic, 'The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787: A Symposium of Views and Reviews,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 44 (1987): 549-640. See especially the essays by Ruth H. Bloch, Pauline Maier, John M. Murrin, and Peter S. Onuf, together with Wood's response, 'Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America.'

26. See 'Some Second Thoughts on Virtue,' especially 200, 206-7.

differ, clash, and even threaten one another's rights, especially if they were rulers. This is why they usually rejected simple forms of government and wanted bills of rights.²⁷ The great republican departure from the Revolutionaries' eighteenth-century sources did not lie in an assumption that republicans would constantly forswear self-interest and think only of the public. It lay in the conviction that in polities without hereditary orders, no one would possess a *permanent* self-interest different from the well-considered interest of the body of the people.

Revolutionary calls for virtue—for the sacrifice of selfish interests and commitment to the public good—were not less prominent or less significant than Wood maintained. Revolutionary fears of a decline of virtue were, indeed, as central to the course of constitutional reform as he suggested. Yet Revolutionary thinkers, I believe, had seldom hoped that individuals would not pursue their own self-interests. On the contrary, a vigorous and vigilant defense of one's own liberties and interests was widely thought of as a necessary characteristic of the citizen of a republic—his contribution of his virtue to the public. Commitment to the public good meant vigilant, continuous attention to the public life. It meant, as well, submission to the will of the community—obedience to law—and this submission had to be a conscious, voluntary act, since sound republics were assumed to be incapable of rigorous, continuing coercion. In these senses, self-immersion, if we understand that term to mean absorption in one's private life to the neglect of public duty, did appear profoundly dangerous to a republic. In these senses, individual desires and private interests *were* supposed to be subordinated to the public interest, even *sacrificed* to public needs. And in these senses, too, the individual's particular

27. David Hume was being neither cynical nor novel when he opened his essay 'Of the Independency of Parliament' by saying: 'Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a *knave*, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.' The early modern theory of mixed government—and Hume was thinking, first, of Harrington and Machiavelli—*began* from the assumption that the many and the few would each oppress the other if power rested wholly in their hands.

desires were certainly expected to give way to the decisions and demands of the community, which might call upon a man to sacrifice his property or, in a war, his life itself to public needs or wishes. But the sacrifice of self was to occur primarily in the submission to community decisions or in taking time from personal enjoyments to attend to public business. It would seldom happen in the *making* of political decisions, where citizens would be restrained by consciousness of others but where they neither could nor should forgo their own self-interests.

These distinctions, I believe, are critical to understanding the development of Revolutionary thinking. They suggest that Wood exaggerated the degree to which the early Revolutionaries held a truly classical (or Montesquieuan) concept of the public good in a republic, and thus that he may also have exaggerated the degree to which the Federalists rejected early-Revolutionary thinking. The central thrust of his interpretation still appears to me correct. Many Revolutionaries did begin to doubt that they were virtuous enough to manage sound republics. Still, the story of the course of Revolutionary thinking might be better understood, and needless controversies partially resolved, by clarifying what it was that late and early Revolutionaries meant by 'virtue': what was classical and what was not in this conception, and what was changing over time. Wood went too far, I think, toward reading in a call for *selfless* political decisions where the early Revolutionaries really hoped for vigorous assertions of the self within a context of communal consciousness and a commitment to abide by the community's decisions. He may thus have left too little room for comprehending Madison's continuing insistence that the people's virtue was, for all of the improvements represented by the Constitution, the only ultimate security for any free regime.

This point is subject to misunderstanding, even in its more complete articulation. Let me, then, say clearly that I do not mean that virtue was a fully 'modern' concept in republican opinion or that Revolutionary thought was never really neoclassical at all. Rather, I am seeking to suggest that Revolutionary thought—in

1787 as in 1776—is best conceived of as an early modern *blend* of liberal and neoclassical ideas, that a coherent mixture of the two traditions was in fact its most distinctive feature. My appeal, in short, is for a reconsideration of the ways in which these two distinguishable traditions interpenetrated and entwined for both the Revolutionaries and their eighteenth-century sources.

Popular participation is another concept that has caused no end of controversies and confusions—and ought to be restudied in this way. At the moment, I believe, there is no better source for understanding what the eighteenth-century British did denote as ‘virtue’ than the writings of John Pocock. Like Wood’s, however, Pocock’s writings are, at once, a proper starting point for further explorations and a fountainhead of difficulties that have been compounded by his followers and critics.

Some of these confusions, we may hope, are on the way toward resolution. For example, Pocock argued that the central theme of eighteenth-century British discourse—the fulcrum on which fundamental changes turned—was its preoccupation with the dangers posed to virtue by the growing role of commerce. This argument became most troublesome when later writers oversimplified what ‘commerce’ meant in Pocock’s formulation, and much of the confusion might be ended simply by accepting his insistence that he never said ‘that republican virtue was incompatible with trade and industry.’²⁸

A second difficulty lies, however, in a drumbeat of complaints that Pocock’s monumental works may nonetheless portray the eighteenth century as more completely classical than was in fact the case. In this complaint, there seems to me more substance, though, again, a sympathetic critic must remark that Pocock has himself insisted that his ‘tunnel’ through the eighteenth century does not exhaust its treasures. *The Machiavellian Moment* reaches back to Aristotle and ahead to Richard M. Nixon, focusing throughout upon a language used by early modern civic humanists

28. *Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Eng., 1985), 272.

to grapple with the secular or temporal dimensions of a polity's existence. To this language, Pocock argued, Locke made little contribution; and the old fixation on the advent and centrality of 'modern,' 'liberal' ideas appeared to him not merely partial but the principal impediment to understanding that the most important changes in eighteenth-century thought were generated by a dialogue concerning virtue and corruption, a dialogue that Locke ignored. But Pocock's effort to construct a history *sans* Locke—a history emancipated from a single-minded, Whiggish search for a direct, uncomplicated line into the present—seems to many to create a new imbalance. His recent essays toward a history of two distinctive, intertwining languages of liberty—one civic humanist, the other civil jurisprudential—have not attempted, yet, to bring Locke back into the picture. And despite his warnings that contemporaries did not see these languages 'as distinct and ideologically' opposing, the very effort to construct two separate tunnels may foster an impression that they were.²⁹ This impression, like a faulty grasp of what the Revolutionaries meant by 'virtue,' interferes in a variety of ways with our attempt to comprehend the Federalists' relationship with earlier opinion.

No republic could be truly classical, as Pocock notes, once individuals receded from a full, direct participation in the public forum and began to be conceived of as contributing their virtue largely—or exclusively, as some elitists hoped—to the selection of their sovereign rulers. Pocock therefore joins with Wood and others to remark that Madison accomplished an amazing feat of intellectual and verbal daring by defining a republic as a government in which the people *do not* 'meet and exercise the government in person,' but 'administer it by their representatives and agents.'³⁰ This, these

29. See, especially, 'The Varieties of Whiggism from Exclusion to Reform: A History of Ideology and Discourse,' *ibid.*, pp. 215–310, and 'Cambridge Paradigms and Scotch Philosophers: A Study of the Relations between the Civic Humanist and the Civil Jurisprudential Interpretation of Eighteenth-Century Social Thought,' in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds., *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, 1984), 235–52, quotation at p. 251.

30. Jacob E. Cooke, ed., *The Federalist* (Middletown, Conn., 1961), no. 14, p. 84. See also no. 10, p. 62.

scholars have remarked, was a direct reversal of the classical or Montesquieuan image of republics. And, indeed, it was, for Madison not only meant to clarify a crucial difference between the new American republics and the archetypal Grecian cities, he meant to argue unequivocally for the superiority of modern representative regimes. But still, what seems to have been wholly overlooked in emphasizing Madison's departure from the ancients is that he departed not at all from early Revolutionary thinking or its eighteenth-century British sources. The English-speaking peoples, after all, had made their peace with representation a hundred years before the American Revolution, whose leaders never thought of anything *except* a representative republic.

Again, in truly classical or Montesquieuan images of the republic, there was little room, as critics of the Pocock-Wood interpretation sometimes gleefully announce, for an antithesis of liberty and power. In the polis, the community's decision had been nothing other than the product of the liberty and virtue that every citizen contributed to public business. Yet here, again, as neither Wood nor Pocock really fails to see, the water had been muddied years before by the acceptance of representation and by the influence of a modern politics of natural rights. In representative, contractual republics, liberty and power could so easily collide that an insistence on the need for public virtue often called, more loudly than for any other thing, for vigilance against the separate interests and ambitions of elected rulers. And for Madison, as clearly as for 'Cato,' Bolingbroke, or Burgh, a jealous independence of ambitious rulers still remained a principal requirement for republics.

What may all of this imply? Most fundamentally, perhaps, that we do not as yet possess the information, terminology, or mental tools that may be needed to describe the transformation of the early Revolutionary universe of thought into the thinking of the 1820s. We do not possess these things, in part, because we cannot clearly see how we should handle the apparent mixture of distinctive modes of discourse which would seem to have been present long before the Revolution opened and, for all the intervening

changes, present also when it closed. While there are solid reasons to distinguish neoclassical and modern-liberal traditions, these would also seem to have been shaping one another more profoundly than our usual reasoning suggests.

At present, as I understand it, scholarly debates about the modern-liberal and classical republican dimensions of early national thought are entering into a different phase. Through the middle 1980s, controversy focused on the relative importance of the two traditions in the years surrounding the adoption of the Constitution. At this writing, these disputes appear to be resulting in a general agreement (not unanimous, of course) that *both* were present in the new republic (as were other modes of thought), that both were vastly influential, and that neither should be seen as having exercised an undisputed primacy during the 1780s or 1790s.³¹ Work proceeds toward understanding how the culture moved through the succeeding decades toward an ultimate predominance of liberal and democratic values, though many would insist that liberal ideas were so entangled at the Revolution with ideas deriving from a different tradition that the consequence would never be the liberal monolith that scholars once described. Ironically, however, we are entering upon this newer exploration in the midst of sharp, continuing disputes about the shape of early Revolutionary thought and, thus, of huge uncertainties about the structure that was in transition. With the starting point uncertain and the outcome in dispute, it has been proving difficult for anyone to write a satisfying history of the developments between.³² How can we account persuasively for change when there is disagreement over nearly everything except its general direction?

We could start, I would suggest, by recognizing that the current talk of many coexisting paradigms, although a marked improve-

31. See note 7 above.

32. 'Quid Transit,' cited in note 18, argues that this is a problem both for Steven Watts, *The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820* (Baltimore, 1987), and for Michael Lienesch, *New Order of the Ages: Time, the Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought* (Princeton, 1988).

ment over older formulations, is still an analytical invention of our own: useful, even necessary for demolishing inflated claims and for exploring some important topics, but nonetheless an artificial reconstruction of the Revolutionary world; a reconstruction, too, which has a strong potential to mislead because it severs what the eighteenth century joined. We might proceed, in other words, by adding questions that have not received so much attention. How did early Revolutionaries and their eighteenth-century sources manage so coherently to blend traditions which seem incompatible to us? How did later Revolutionaries grapple with this rather awkward combination?

Not long ago, John Murrin called the argument about the 'Great Transition' — the movement from a 'premodern' to a 'modern' society and culture — 'the most important controversy taking shape in recent years about early American history.'³³ Murrin was referring to the controversy over whether any such transition actually occurred, for it is possible, of course, to argue that America was *always* liberal and modern. Since 1960, nevertheless, the larger portion of the most exciting work in early American history has emphasized the differentness of eighteenth-century life. Most historians, accordingly, would now accept the concept of a Great Transition. Recently, in fact, the growing interest in this transformation has been promising a massive reinterpretation of the years surrounding 1800 as a period of sweeping cultural and social change.³⁴ In effect, the current generation's rediscovery of the republican tradition, followed by renewed insistence on the liberating novelty of liberal ideas, has led us to perceive the early Revolution as decidedly pre-modern; and this impression has been

33. John M. Murrin, 'Self-Interest Conquers Patriotism: Republicans, Liberals, and Indians Reshape the Nation,' in Greene, ed., *The American Revolution*, p. 225.

34. See Wood's ambitious effort to reconceptualize the period in 'The Significance of the Early Republic,' *Journal of the Early Republic* 8 (1988): 1–20. It is worth remarking that of all Wood's recent writings, this essay may contain the strongest stress on the 'classical,' anti-commercial, or anti-modern features of Revolutionary thinking (pp. 11–12). But see 'Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution' (*Beyond Confederation*, pp. 69–109), which also seems to me a significant revision of the position of *The Creation of the American Republic*.

leading us, in turn, to squeeze the Great Transition more intensively into the early national years (most commonly, into the years between the middle 1790s and the middle 1820s). Rapid social change, on these assumptions, helps account for the increasing dominance of liberal values and ideas, and rapid transformation of political beliefs is used, in turn, as evidence that social change was more intensive in this period than used to be supposed, since most of us are wary of idealist interpretations in which thinking seems to change according to its own dynamic.

Without disputing much of this interpretive thrust, it may be useful to suggest that there are several reasons for discomfort. Are we reasoning in a circle — and a circle, for that matter, which does not produce an accurate description of America at either the beginning of the Revolution or its end? How are we to weigh the impact during any span of years of 'a transformation of social perceptions, political judgment, economic endeavor, and private sensibility'³⁵ that required at least a century for its completion? Was the force and pace of 'liberalizing change,' as Steven Watts describes it, so intense and so profound at any point within this period that we can pack a revolutionary transformation into any part of it that we may happen to examine — the 1780s, the 1790s, or the years between the middle nineties and the War of 1812?³⁶ Finally, if early Revolutionary thought was actually more modern than the masterworks of the republican interpretation would suggest, but if James Madison and others also broke less sharply with republican tradition than is commonly supposed, how should narrative historians proceed?

The principal necessity, I think, is for renewed attention to that early Revolutionary blend of modern-liberal and neoclassical concerns, a study which would have to start with further exploration of its origins in seventeenth-century England. A clearer under-

35. Watts, *The Republic Reborn*, 6.

36. This may become even harder in the aftermath of Jack P. Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1988), which mounts a powerful challenge to the prevailing emphasis on the differentness of eighteenth-century life and values.

standing of the early modern mixture present when the Revolution opened is essential to a better understanding of its course. Such an understanding may require, as well, a different perspective on its close.

A recent article by Peter Onuf warns that we are often too inclined to link the Revolutionary reconstruction of political ideas to sweeping, sudden transformations in the social and economic context. The Constitution and the Federalist achievement, this suggests, may after all have been essentially the outcome of a crisis of the union: that is, of the specifically *political* developments connected with the founding of a federal republic.³⁷ It might be added that we commonly portray the Revolutionary reconstruction of political ideas, dramatic as that was, as in itself more sweeping than some further reconsiderations may support. A dozen years of grappling with James Madison has made me more and more inclined to think that Onuf is correct in calling for a stronger emphasis on the centrality of federal concerns. It has persuaded me, as well, of the advantages of thinking of the great Virginian as a liberal republican through all of his career.

Here, also, it appears, I may be forced to say repeatedly that this is *not* primarily an argument that Madison was philosophically consistent; and it is *not* an argument that his opinions never changed. Yet Madison, who is conventionally (and rightly) seen as the outstanding figure in the Federalist revision of republican ideas, did, after all, almost immediately assume the lead in the formation of the first political party. And Madison did say that after giving all due praise to constitutional contrivances for making liberty secure, 'it ought . . . to be remembered that they are neither the sole nor the chief palladium of constitutional liberty. The people, who are the authors of this blessing, must also be its guardians.'³⁸ 'To suppose that any form of government will secure

37. Onuf, 'Reflections on the Founding.'

38. 'Government of the United States,' in William T. Hutchinson, Robert A. Rutland, et al., eds., *The Papers of James Madison*, 16 vols. to date (Chicago and Charlottesville, Va., 1962-), 14: 218 (originally published in the *National Gazette*, February 4, 1792).

liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people is a chimerical idea.³⁹

'Virtue,' to be sure, did not connote for Madison the superhuman quality that Montesquieu had said was known to moderns 'only by tradition.'⁴⁰ Madison did not believe that men were angels or that the United States was any kind of Sparta. But 'virtue' did connote, for Madison as clearly as for eighteenth-century critics of the British Whig regime, a jealous, vigilant commitment to the public life: continuing participation by the body of a democratic people in a politics which trusted only limited responsibilities to national rulers and demanded, even then, that these officials be continuously watched for any signs of an appearance of a separate set of interests. Slothful inattention to the public business or an enervated and debauched indulgence in a merely private life still seemed to Madison to be as dangerous to commonwealths as they had seemed to be to Bolingbroke or Burgh. And Madison insisted, too, as strongly as these British oppositionists had done, that liberty was incompatible with standing armies, overgrown executives, and swollen public debts.⁴¹ If 'virtue' did not signify for him what it had signified for Montesquieu or for the ancients, it still undoubtedly denoted most of what it had implied for eighteenth-century British oppositionists and their early Revolutionary heirs.

A better understanding of such terms may therefore be essential if we are to see that Madison did not assume a central place among the Revolutionary thinkers because he was the central figure in the substitution of a modern politics of interest for an ancient politics of virtue. Rather, Madison was most distinctive and most nearly indispensable, I think, because he stubbornly denied that it was necessary for Americans to choose between the two varieties of

39. Speech in the Virginia Ratifying Convention of 1788, in Jonathan Elliot, ed., *The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution . . .*, (Washington, D.C., 1854), 5 vols., 3: 536-37.

40. *The Spirit of the Laws*, bk. 3, chap. 5.

41. Before as well as after Hamilton delivered his reports on public credit. See, for example, his speech of June 29 in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, rev. ed., 4 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1966), 1: 464-65; *The Federalist*, no. 41, pp. 273-74; and Elliot, *Debates*, 3: 382.

liberty that were, alike, supremely valued in the Revolutionaries' mixed inheritance from eighteenth-century thought.⁴² The most profound of all the founders reasoned in these terms and held to values drawn from both traditions well into the 1830s, though he did so during his retirement in the face of potent tendencies to simplify his generation's thinking and to undervalue its achievements.⁴³ But a better understanding of the founder and of the ideas that he opposed may both require new explorations of the early modern thinking in which Madison was reared.

42. This argument, currently being developed in a book on Madison and the Founding, is sketched more fully in three essays: 'James Madison and the Nationalists, 1780-1783,' *William and Mary Quarterly* 40 (1983): 237-55; 'The Hamiltonian Madison: A Reconsideration,' *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 92 (1984): 3-28; and '1787 and 1776: Patrick Henry, James Madison, the Constitution, and the Revolution,' in Neil L. York, ed., *Toward a More Perfect Union: Six Essays on the Constitution* (Provo, Utah, 1988), pp. 59-89.

43. Drew R. McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy* (Cambridge, Eng., 1989).

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