# ON THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN COLLEGE TEXT-BOOKS AND TEACHING IN LOGIC, ETHICS, PSYCHOLOGY AND ALLIED SUBJECTS.

BY G. STANLEY HALL.

NINE years ago, General Eaton, then Commissioner of Education at Washington, was kind enough to collect for me the text-books then in use in all American colleges and universities, which would answer the circular, in the departments of ethics, logic, and psychology, as well as in the more or less accessory departments of history of philosophy, metaphysics, evidences of Christianity, natural theology, æsthetics, etc. These subjects were commonly, though not always, taught by the President during the senior year, and were, usually, in a sense the culminating or finishing studies of the old American B. A. college course. These data, with those of other branches, have lately been printed in the Commissioner's Report. Meanwhile, I have collected many other text-books and titles in these fields, making over three hundred in all, a list of which is appended.[1] I have used nearly a score of them myself with classes, and have tried to find data in college histories concerning the methods and matter of these courses in the past. The work is by no means complete, and this paper must be regarded as a few observations upon this list, in the preparation of which I have been under obligations, which I take pleasure in expressing, to Mr. Winsor who has kindly aided me in the Harvard Library, to Mr. Dexter who has done the same at Yale, to Mr. Barton, the librarian of this

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[1] Page 162.

Society, and especially to the head of the Worcester Public Library, Mr. Samuel S. Green, to whose assistance I am greatly indebted. No one can be better aware than I am how imperfect and inadequate to so vast a subject this work is. In this paper I shall pass rather hastily over the historical part, in the fuller elaboration of which, later, I earnestly hope I may profit from the suggestions of the many members of this Society who are far wiser than I in that part of the field, to certain practical conclusions in which some degree of confidence has been reached.

At the beginning of this century there were but eighteen colleges in this country. Most of these had but little history, and that very imperfectly recorded. This for the first few years often contained little but the charter, names, dates, figures, accounts of buildings and benefactors, and extremely little about the matter or methods of instruction. Indeed, in all the best and latest histories and records, surprisingly little is said of the actual work in the class-room. In some cases there is for years no record in any form of text-books, and all details about older curricula must be inferred from indirect sources.

Josiah Quincy, in his History of Harvard University, Vol. 1, pp. 190–4, says: "the exercises of the students had the aspect of a theological rather than a literary institution. They were practised twice a day in reading the Scriptures, giving an account of their proficiency and experience in practical and spiritual truths accompanied by theoretical observations on the language and logic of the sacred writings. They were carefully to attend God's ordinances and be examined on their profiting; commonplacing the sermons and repeating them publicly in the hall.

"Such were the principles of education established in the College under the authority of Dunster. Nor does it appear that they were materially changed during the whole of the seventeenth century. Improvements were introduced but gradually, and neither their date nor their particulars are anywhere distinctly stated in the College records." The chief, if not the only, requirements for admission were "so much Latin as was sufficient to understand Tully or any like classical author and to make and speak true Latin, in prose and verse, and so much Greek as was included in declining perfectly the paradigms of the Greek nouns and verbs."

"The studies of the first year were 'logic, physic, etymology, syntax, and practice on the principles of grammar.' Those of the second year, 'ethics, politics, prosody and dialects, practice of poesy and Chaldee.' Those of the third, 'arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, exercises in style, composition, epitome, both in prose and verse, Hebrew and Syriac.'

"In every year and every week of the College course, every class was practised in the Bible and catechetical divinity; also in history in the winter and in the nature of plants in the summer. Rhetoric was taught by lectures in every year and each student was required to declaim once a month."

"To the general student and such as were not destined to 'the work of the ministry,' the exercises of the College must have been irksome and, in their estimation, unprofitable. The reading every morning a portion of the Old Testament out of Hebrew into Greek, and every afternoon a portion of the New Testament out of English into Greek, however it might improve their knowledge of these languages respectively, could not greatly accelerate or enlarge their acquaintance with Scripture or tend vividly to excite their piety. The exposition, required by the laws of the College to be made by the Presidents, of the chapters read at the morning and evening services, although greatly lauded for its utility and made the repeated subject of inquiry by active members of the Board of Overseers, seems not to have been of any material efficiency in point of instruction." Yet President Quincy quotes approvingly the statement of

President Mather that under this course students were taught "*libere philosophari, et in nullius jurare verba magistri.*"

In the "Laws, liberties and orders of Harvard College," confirmed annually from 1642 to 1646, we read: "Every one shall consider the main end of his life and studies to know God and Jesus Christ, which is eternal life. John 17. 3.

"Seeing the Lord giveth wisdom, every one shall seriously by prayer in secret seek wisdom of Him.

"Every scholar that on proof is found able to read the originals of the Old and New Testament into the Latin tongue and to resolve them logically, withal being of honest life and conversation, and at any public act hath approbation of the Overseers and Master of the College, may be invested with his first degree.

"Every scholar that giveth up in writing a synopsis or summary of logic, natural and moral philosophy, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy, and is ready to defend his thesis or positions, withal skilled in the originals as aforesaid, and still continues honest and studious, at any public act, after trial, he shall be capable of the second degree of Master of Arts."

Mather, in his Magnalia, says: "They that peruse the theses of the batchelors of later years published, will find that though the Ramæan discipline be in this college preferred to the Aristotelunan, yet they do not so confine themselves unto that neither, as to deprive themselves of that *libera philosophia* which the *good spirits* of the age have embraced, ever since the great Lord Bacon show'd 'em the way to 'the advancement of learning' but they seem to be rather of the *sect* begun by Potamon, called *Εκλεκτικοι*, who, adhering to no former sect, chose out of them all what they lik'd best in any of them: at least I am sure they do not show such a veneration for Aristotle as is express'd at Queen's Colledge in Oxford; where they read Aristotle on their *knees*, and those who take degrees are *sworn* to defend his philosophy. A Venetian writer pretends to enumerate no less than twelve thousand volumes published in the fourteenth age, about the philosophy of Aristotle. None of ours will add to the number."

In 1708 we read that "an ancient and laudable practice" was revived. "At morning prayers all the undergraduates were ordered, beginning with the youngest, to read a verse out of the Old Testament from the Hebrew into Greek, except the freshmen, who were permitted to use their English Bibles in the exercise, and at evening service to read from the New Testament out of the Latin translation into Greek, whenever the President performed this service in the Hall."

In the visitation voted by the Overseers in 1728 it appeared that "Master's disputations and Bachelor's declamations were declining," that students read freely authors of different denominations, that the Greek Catechism was recited by freshmen without exposition, that Wollebius and Ames's system of divinity were recited by other classes with expositions on Saturday, that repetitions of the sermons of the foregoing Sabbath were made by students on Saturday evening when the President is present, and that they attend in greater numbers at prayers when there are no readings.

These, and a few other passages no more definite, a few old text-books, the quaint topics of theses, disputations and Commencement parts, especially the subjects for Master's degree at Harvard between 1655 and 1791, collected by Professor Edward J. Young,[1] are about all I have yet found concerning curricula for the first century after the foundation of Harvard in 1634.

The Yale record is but little fuller. President Porter in his account of "Mental and Moral Science in Yale," in Kingsley's History, says, in substance, that a copy of the first edition of Locke's Essay, given by Governor Yale in

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[1] Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1880–81.

1714, two years before Jonathan Edwards entered as a lad of thirteen, had very much to do with the history of philosophic thought, not only in Yale, but in the country. At the age of fourteen he read Locke with an enjoyment as keen, he tells us, as "the most greedy miser finds when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold." At the age of seventeen he drew Berkeley's conclusion without having read him, as follows: "That which truly is the substance of all bodies is the infinitely exact, precise and perfectly stable idea in God's mind, together with the stable will that the same shall gradually be communicated to us and to other minds according to certain fixed, exact and established methods and laws." Edwards enriched and broadened theology with the best philosophy of his time. There were two sides to Edwards as there were to Schleiermacher, the great founder of contemporary German theology. He worked almost his entire system with the two sentiments of love and fear. Though we are not free he made the essence of our acts to consist not in their freedom, but in their spontaneity. The fall did not bring a new evil principle into the world, but was merely the withdrawal of divine aid. Remote as he is from us, his standpoint marked great progress. If he was infected with the religious panics and phobias of his day, he dwelt upon beneficence and the love of being, which he made the foundation of all virtues, and turned theology from discussions of the nature of the trinity to its human relations. His method of exact sequential reasoning was the very apotheosis of the ideal of logic as the culmination of academic discipline which had prevailed in this country up to this time. Throughout most of the century after the founding of Harvard, logic seems to have grown more and more the foible of academic New England, and, although the forte of the New Englander was always character, ethical teaching sank to insignificance.

The works of John Robinson, collected by Ashton, are largely ethical, and treat of health, marriage, liberty, fashions, studies, etc. But after Roger Williams was banished in 1636, and the Cambridge Synod had condemned eighty-two opinions, the Puritan mind narrowed and darkened down, and morals consisted in Sabbath observance, Bible reading, baptisms and other theological duties, as different in matter as in method from those taught by the Leyden pastor. The cause of the blue-law tendency, which so dwarfed moral teaching, must be sought in the monastic severity of the Puritan theocracy. The struggle with the climate, the hardship of cultivating the alleged soil, provincial isolation, the slow atrophy of a life always in the face of death; these had narrowed mental life, somewhat as the entire cult of the Hebrews was condensed by the long sojourn in the desert to what could be strapped upon a camel's back.

The slow transition from this long, logical period of our collegiate history to the emotional, may perhaps be conveniently marked by the arrival of Whitefield in New England in 1740. Whitefield complained that "tutors neglected to pray with and examine the hearts of their pupils, that most schools and universities had sunk into new seminaries of paganism, that their light had become a darkness that could be felt, that students read Tillotson and Clark instead of Shepard and Stoddard." Harvard seems at first impressed by Whitefield, and in 1741 the Overseers voted to meet and "spend some time in humble thanksgiving to God for the effusion of His Holy Spirit." Later, after Whitfield had declared that few ministers were converted, the New England clergy took formal exception to some of Whitefield's methods, and Wigglesworth wrote him from Harvard pointing out the dangers of enthusiasm and censuring the "furious zeal with which you had so fired the passions of the people, which hath in many places burnt into the very vitals of religion" and the "sudden and temporary turns of distress and joy." The condition of studies in the second third of the eighteenth century was not encouraging. The colleges were poor, small, and manned essentially by the president and a few tutors. The president, it was said, must attend to the manners of the students "entertained at the College." The Yale MS. laws of 1720 and 1726 say, all students after they have done reciting rhetoric and ethics on Friday recite Wollaston's theology, and on Saturday morning they shall recite Ames's theology and Medulla, and on Saturday evening the catechism in Latin, and on Sabbath morning attend exposition of Ames's cases of conscience. In 1726 Mr. Flynt, fifty-five years tutor at Harvard, described the studies as follows: *Freshmen*, Grammar, Virgil, Greek Testament. Friday, Dugard or Farnaby's Rhetoric. Ramus's definitions with disputations Monday and Tuesday. *Sophomores*, Burgersdicius's Logic. Heereboord's Maletemata and Wollebius's Divinity Saturday, and disputations Monday and Tuesday. *Junior sophistes*, Heereboord continued, More's ethics. Disputations Monday and Tuesday. *Senior sophistes*, Ames's Medulla, review of the Arts and weekly disputations. The decline went on despite many laudable efforts to reverse the currents. In 1732 the younger Hollis added £700 to his father's £350 to establish two professorships. In 1738 the tutor in Mathematics was exempted at Harvard from the rule that subjected each student to examination on his religious principles. The impulses to science and especially literature in Queen Anne's reign slowly spread to Massachusetts, and President Holyoke and the Overseers made a ten years' struggle to change the curriculum and raise the standard. In 1754 the Overseers objected to the state of elocution and the standard of the classes and strove to promote oratory, and suggested Erasmus's Colloquies. The Hollis prizes for Latin, Greek, and Hebrew were established to the same end. In 1761 the Overseers were told by their Committee that "Students are not required to translate English into Latin nor Latin into English, neither in verse nor prose, and suggested a thesis with opposition and rejoinder." Trumbull's *Progress of Dulness* scored the neglect of literature and oratory.

This second academic tendency toward revivalism has, like the logic-cult, been very persistent. It did not become dominant in the New England colleges already established, as it did in some of those founded later. Durfee makes the early history of Williams College to consist chiefly of efforts to secure the conversion of the students. Its dark periods are years of spiritual drought, when "Professors were hardly distinguished from the body of the impenitent," and he describes with great personal detail the seasons of awakening, as in 1825, when there were "thirty converts in thirty days." Edward Hitchcock, in his Reminiscences of Amherst, says: "The religious history of Amherst is more important and interesting than everything pertaining to it," and enumerates fourteen revivals up to 1863 and estimates that three hundred and fifty began their religious life there.

A third academic movement was the expansion of systematic ethics. Morals had been taught from the first, but the movement that culminated in the Declaration of Independence made itself felt much earlier in a tendency to teach morals with at least partial independence of theology. There are two convenient and conspicuous landmarks of this tendency. The first is the Yale President, Thomas Clap's "Essay on the Nature and Foundation of Moral Virtue and Obligations: Being a Short Introduction to the Study of Ethics, for the use of the Students of Yale College," in 1765, and the second the gift of £1,362 by John Alford to Harvard College in 1789, to establish a chair of "Natural Religion, Mental Philosophy and Civil Polity in the College for ever." President Clap's sixty-six page Ethics premises that "as moral philosophy makes a considerable part of our academical education and is nearly connected with true religion, it is of great importance that it should be clearly stated and fixed upon the right foundations." Its chief rule is to avoid *anomia* or sin. "Virtue is not by nature but by a Divine gift." The Greek philosophy came from Moses and the Prophets. There is no mere natural religion apart from Revelation. Yet he discusses a number of the chief virtues on their merits, and closes by defending stratagem in war as not lying.

Alford's will declares that the principal duty of the incumbent shall be "to demonstrate the existence of a deity or first cause, to prove and illustrate his essential attributes, both natural and moral, to explain his providence and government together with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments; also to deduce and enforce the obligations which man is under to his Maker and the duties which he owes him, resulting from the perfections of the duty and from his own rational nature; together with the most important duties of social life, resulting from the several relations which men mutually bear to each other; and likewise the several duties which respect ourselves, founded not only on our own interest but also on the will of God; interspersing the whole with remarks showing the coincidence between the doctrines of revelation and the dictates of reason in these important points; and lastly, notwithstanding this coincidence, to state the absolute necessity and vast utility of a divine revelation.

"He shall also read a distinct course of lectures upon that branch of moral philosophy which respects the application of the laws of nature to nations and their relative rights and duties; and also on the absolute necessity of civil government in some form and the reciprocal rights and duties of magistrates and of the people resulting from the social compact; and also on the various forms of government which have existed or may exist in the world, pointing out their respective advantages and disadvantages, and what form of government is best adapted to promote the greatest happiness of mankind.

"And to the end that a regular systematical division of the foregoing subjects and of all the other branches of science which come under this institution may be had and preserved, as well as a due proportion of time devoted to each, it is declared that the said Professor shall be under the control of the President and Fellows and Overseers of the said College who may from time to time give such directions relative thereto as they shall judge fit and proper, and as shall be consistent with the rules and orders of this institution.

"The said Professor shall read his lectures on natural religion to all the four classes of undergraduates; those on moral philosophy to the two senior classes; and those on civil polity to the senior class only; provided nevertheless that the officers of the college and resident graduates as likewise such other gentlemen as the corporation shall permit shall have a right to attend all or any of the lectures aforementioned."

Ethics encountered much opposition at first and never came to its full independent right till the Unitarian movement. Faith was better than works. If works were not "filthy rags" they could not save men. In his diary, in 1716, Cotton Mather says: "There are some unwise things done about which I must watch for opportunity to bear public testimony; one is the employing so much time upon Ethik in College, a vile form of paganism." Elsewhere he calls ethics "*Impietas in artis formam redacta.*" Ethics suggested Cicero, Plutarch and perhaps the Stoa. If this prejudice existed in the logical it was intensified under the revivalistic régime and after deists had attacked the clergy for a century in the name of ethics and natural religion. Mark Hopkins with his semi-theological ethics was a radical innovation in the eyes of his predecessor, President Griffin, who preferred to appeal, as he could so urgently, to the heart with exhortation to instant repentance.

The old deductive syllogistic logic, which in our ignorance of its ultimate origin seems an epoch-making creation of the genius of Aristotle, was developed among the most disputatious of races and probably begun as rules of the game of dialectics or debate. The charm of personal encounter and rejoinder, argument and refutation, and even mere informal dialogue and colloquy, is what has always given zest to deductive logic. From the days of the Sophists through the Academy and Stoa, to the great forensics of Abelard and the scholastics, and the church councils before and after Luther's theses, disputation was the chief academic method. Weekly, semi-weekly, or even daily, between students and professors interest centered in debate. Imaginary responders were set up if there were no real ones. It was the method by which not only all the doctrines of theology and metaphysics were laboriously worked out in forge and heat, and forced home upon unwilling or sceptical minds, but by which the problems of empirical science were often treated to her great loss. Of all this, deductive logic was, of course, the canon and norm. It was no wonder, therefore, that the doctrine of fallacies became, and is now, for the average college student, the most interesting part.

The old logic had, too, another and very different function, it was the *organon* of the soul in dealing with ideas, especially the highest categories, innate intuitions, intellectual species, etc., which realism made more real than anything else, and which for Hegel made the world real, because it made it rational, with a reality so real that beside it the material world of sight and touch seemed but the shadow of a dream. Now these have taken the form of fixed types in nature with which Darwinism waged its long warfare. They have been regarded as entities, universals, now in nature, now in mind, now immanent, now transcendent, often as the *natura ipsissima* of God in directly envisaging and contemplating which Schopenhauer said the soul found its only surcease from pain. These *summa genera* were precious because brought forth with such long labor, involving a midwifery more consummate than that of Socrates. The forms of predication controlled grammar in those days when *bonus grammaticus bonus theologus* was literally true. They presided over rhetoric and oratory in which the education of ancient Rome culminated and which has cadenced and given pace to the soul of ingenuous youth, as well as been a powerful method of influence and even of government, ever since. When realism fell and some dared to say that these ideas and forms that ruled the world were mere words, *flatus vocis*, the foundation of the entire ideal world of Plato, the church and Dante seemed crumbling. Bacon and Comenius proposed new methods; Locke urged that the ideas were mere generalizations from experience. Inductive logic, however, has followed and not led science. I cannot recall a single discovery of a single investigator avowedly due to a conscious application of a method from a treatise on logic. Whewell's *novum organum renovatum*, like Mill's Logic, which owed so much to it, is a partial description and federalization of methods that *had* succeeded. Mill undertook his work in defiance of Whately, who, with Sir William Hamilton, was the chief modern restorer of the old logic, and who had said that we could not generalize modes of investigation, especially in the absence of any adequate history of science. But anything like a philosophy of discovery, or even a good description of the way in which Faraday, Mendeleyeff or Helmholtz work, is a part of the psychology of genius that remains to be written. Few would agree with Jevons who calls Mill's great and invaluable work an "incubus of bad logic and bad philosophy." Even Jevons concludes his own logic in a collapsing way by showing what incomparable drafts science makes upon our powers of comprehension and belief, and says that all man's hopes and determinations are like the instincts of ants and bees, full of, and controlled by, an all dominating purpose too vast to be comprehended, while all about us cries out for a higher explanation. Lotze tried to give a new turn to logic by urging that its object was not ultimately with *a priori* noetic elements, or stoichiology, as Hamilton thought, but instead of being analytic it was synthetic and its task was to work out and put together a system of coherent conclusions which would appeal to us as self evident by a criterion that was at bottom æsthetic. Only thus could logic save us from the present idolatry of experience and scepticism. Boole, too, concludes that in the main, philosophical studies have failed to keep pace with the advance of the several departments of knowledge whose internal relations it is its province to determine. If this is so, even the logic of classification of sciences, attempted by Comte, Spencer, Wundt, Grasserie, and others, and some degree of which is basal for every kind of curriculum of study, has failed, and shows only the *res angusta domi* of the systematizer's mind.

Inductive logic, too, it must be confessed with sorrow, has not proven its academic viability. Although taught extensively in the text-books of Bain, Jevons, and Fowler, the deductive forms, still deemed so valuable for the clergyman and lawyer, are now far more widely taught in this country in text-books like Davis, Coppe, Schuyler, Tigert, Whately, McCosh, and Bowen. Its value in Christian evidences, theism, or natural theology as fields of its application (Wright, Fisher, Valentine, Jouin, Chadbourn, Barclay, Flint, Mulford, Peabody) is believed to be high. At any rate, it has lately gained ground, while the Hegelian logic, earnestly as it has been propagated, has barely a foothold, and the symbolic logic of De Morgan and Boole is too recondite.

My conclusion and belief is, that the educational value of logic is great, but now chiefly historical, and that it should be taught, if at all, by a text-book which could be easily made according to the following recipe. On the basis of the histories of logic by Ueberweg and Prantl, the history of categories by Trendelenberg, of ideas by Heyder, and of metaphysical problems by Eucken, the story of logical idealism from Plato to Abelard should be concisely told. This is at the very least the great romance of the human intelligence up to that date. From there onward the inductive era should be sketched with copious but concise details, including a description of graphic and statistical methods, the doctrine of probabilities, which has been well called "good sense reduced to calculation," something about standards, constants, symbols, substitutions, analogy, continuity, how to observe, test, simplify, vary, hypothesis, classification, averages and means, nomenclature and fallacies, but all concrete, with method never taught apart from matter of as high educational value as possible. By some such way logic could serve better than it now does, two of the great ends of education; its inductive side would open the eye-gate and the ear-gate, and teach the great lesson of careful observation, which so few learn, bring our academic youth so close to nature and give them the ideal of the broadest possible basis of experience, and that in its season [instead of allowing them to go through life color-blind or note-deaf, as I think no child need to be], and make them susceptible and responsive, far more than they are, to every faintest suggestion from facts. Deduction should teach them to knit the soul and brain together. The syllogism and sorites are of course at best only a rough preliminary darning stitch, but any path however rough between one part of the brain and another, strengthens a thought plexus that has great staying and steadying power. I think that severe sequent thinking may somehow mediate an exchange between brain points of high and those of low pressure, interchanging between areas of excessive and defective neural energy and tension, and thus make for sanity as well as growth. However this may be, it would be better yet, I am coming to think, to drop logic entirely, or at least, save as an elective, and in its place to put a vigorous training in some pure science studied for discipline as an incomparable field of applied logic. The professor should know logic and spice each dish with it, but a little serious and special training in a good laboratory or seminary brings the mind to a sharper focus and gives it a better logical temper, and fits for success in any vocation better than the same time spent on any kind of logic. This I think is now the tendency of opinion.

Ethics was the second branch of philosophy to attain academic prominence in this country. Although taught from the first, it was only after the revivalism, which began in 1740, and often despite its influence, that it slowly advanced to a place beside, and then above, logic. Unlike logic it has acquired a distinctively American form and more than any other collegiate department represents the national εθος γ νομος. At first it was chiefly theological, virtue was likeness to God, His will was the supreme warrant for duty, and religious sins like impenitence, prayerlessness, unbelief, were dwelt upon. In this respect there was little change from More's Enchiridion down through the moralists of the latter part of the 17th and most of the 18th century to Paley, whose Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy reached a tenth American edition in 1821. Almost the only progress in Ethics was the tediously controversial transition from the view that morality was a code of laws which God revealed in Scripture, to the view that his code was best studied in the innate intuitions and sentiments of man. Thus Clarke, Shaftesbury, Cudworth, Hutcheson, and even Adam Smith, Beattie, and Mackintosh who often seem dreary and obsolete, really humanized ethics by transferring its criteria from the arbitrary behest of an extra mundane being to the same inner oracle that Socrates revered.

Two decades before the Declaration of Independence, which owes so much to this movement, our ethical textbooks began again, as they had rarely done since Aristotle, to expatiate upon political rights and duties that though few were inalienable. The moral man again became a political animal and the duties of citizens to the State, and nations to each other, were laid down in a way that anticipated the political ethics of Lieber. This has been done in most American text-books since, even the good old Quaker Dymond almost justifying war. James Burgh's Dignity of Human Nature, although written in the second quarter of the 18th century, was published in several American editions fifty years later.

McBride's Principles of Morality, dedicated to Dr. Rush, Boston, 1796, is one of the first text-books on ethics with physiological references. The Unitarian movement, with its belief in good works, and which entered the academic field through Channing's translation of Jouffroy, has vastly enlarged the scope of ethics in our colleges. The anti-slavery movement and many other reforms, so peculiar to our American life, have all left their mark upon college ethics and no doubt owe much that is best in them to it. Text-books have never increased so fast in number as during the last few years. The teacher can now choose between two or three score of books, some, like Gow, Comyges, Yonge, are chiefly inspiring records of good and great deeds or lives, like those the French government now specially authorize there. More, like Gregory, Bierblower, Hyde, treat each chief virtue or vice serially, with individual methods of grouping and classifying. In others, like Calderwood, Fowler, Green, Martineau, theory dominates. In neither logic, psychology, nor any branch of the great science of man, if in all combined, have there been so many text-books of American make as in ethics; while if we widen our view to include the scores of printed sermons, lecture courses, letters, guides, manuals and "own books" addressed to young men or young women, of ethical import, we shall realize that we have here an American specialty equalled in no other age or land. We seem either to have had exceptional causes to feel solicitous about the young, or else to be a nation of unusual pedagogical proclivities. To understand this peculiar national manifestation we must look to a recently developed field of anthropology where, I think, the cause becomes apparent.

Education, as a public, as distinct from a family, function, has begun in nearly all races with puberty. Most savage tribes mark its advent by rites, ceremonies, and initiations, often the most elaborate and solemn of life. The youth now gets a personal name, is scarred, tattooed with the totem of the tribe, loses teeth, a finger joint, or undergoes a prescribed period of solitude, hunger, or torture. Among civilized races, the Greek, Russian, Catholic, Lutheran, and Episcopal Churches confirm after a special discipline of mind and heart. The pubescent in ancient Greece became a cadet, an *ephebos*, and perhaps received a mentor or inspirer. At this period, as Sir Henry Maine shows, Roman guardianship ended. From two careful, but not yet very extended, collections of statistics it appears that a larger per cent. of conversions occur during the early teens than at any other period. Thus its recognition as an important era has been all but universal. In all countries where its history can be traced to an indigenous origin, public education has begun with puberty and has developed downward toward the kindergarten and upward toward the university or graduate course in proportion as civilization has advanced.

In this respect, the instincts of our nature have fitted its physiology. At this period all is solvent, plastic, vulnerable and formative. Previous individuality is broken up and its elements, with many new ones added from other roots of the family tree, mosaiced together on a new plan. Hence the need of that shelter and safety which Mark Hopkins thought should be first of all sought. Not only new traits but new desires, passions, and often diseases now first appear. The more mongrel the stock or the more numerous the strains of bloods of which it is composed, and the more unsettled the body of ethnic or national customs, traditions, and beliefs, the more critical does the whole adolescent period become. Pure stocks with settled ways and ideals, which pass this ferment safely and quickly, are at one extreme, and a composite nation like our own, with new and diverse models of thought and life, and everything unsettled, is open to unparalleled dangers of arrested development. Any one of many elements may get precocious control and destroy that poise or temperance which Aristotle made the chief of virtues. It is a universal law of growth that every faculty, whether of sense or mind, is developed before the power of controlling it. But if this period of adolescent immaturity is exceptionally prolonged and dangerous here, the possibilities of ultimate and complete manhood are correspondingly greater. The treatment or economic utilization of the vital force given us in these years of physiological regeneration as our life capital, is the life problem in which all higher pedagogic wisdom culminates. Indeed, in a sense, not only education but civilization is tested by the regimen which it affords adolescence, which has a physiological duration of at least a decade. The Hindoos developed its natural dreaminess, the ancient Persians its nascent pugnacity, the Greeks applied physical training in the great games, the Romans cadenced the soul with rhetoric and oratory, the Jesuits appealed chiefly to the instincts of rivalry and competition, so strong at this age, the Germans up to a generation or two ago applied speculative philosophy and aroused a type of romantic enthusiasm among students which has had a profound effect upon the national life; the old American college course developed a treatment which was as original as it was well adapted to its conditions, by giving a general view or periscope over many subjects at first and culminating, in the last year or two of the course, in ethics, generally taught by the President and made the most serious and personal of all studies.

Now, a deeper sense of personal purity or impurity is possible than ever before. There is also a natural prodigality and fluctuation of emotion, so that while the senses and intellect rarely become insane at this time the emotional nature is peculiarly prone to both defect and perversion; and the worst of it is, these aberrations are hardest to detect and worse in their effects upon after life. The rapidly forming new tissue must be irrigated with blood, the whole body is never so erethic, young men are by nature orgiastic and must have excitement; if they cannot get it in the high form of intellectual enthusiasm they are more likely to get it in the sphere of drink or sex, or both. The higher love is a kind of kinetic or clinical equivalent of the lower, and if the soul cannot climb up some such a ladder as Plato described in his symposium it is more likely to grovel and twine about what is lowest and worst. The powers which ascend highest are rooted the lowest in our animal nature.

To apply here a transcendental supernatural cult that shall incline young men to regard duties as of the highest or divine origin is simply to appeal to that three-fourths of life that is instinctive and emotional, the development of which precedes and conditions that of the intellect, and can be stirred deeply only if dimly. To be solely logical and rationalistic is to appeal to a part of our nature yet weak and nascent. I would not bring back the day of the Admirable Convert of Baxter's Call, but, both as a physiologist and a teacher, I am convinced that several of the latest text-books in ethics, which urge that our current morality is but a survival of a faith now dead, that seriously discuss the worth of life and apply a hedonistic calculus, that leaves happiness merely a duty to be desperately performed, do not make for poise and sanity in a land of Americanists. Probably young men's nerves are now rarely tonic enough to play again those awful and soul-quaking old anthems of

Socratic conviction of ignorance or Calvinistic conviction of sin. But although the higher religious life be more and more conceived as a growth and less as a sudden conquest or the irruption of an alien principle, I think we must admit the need of rousing the deepest and strongest sense of the mystery and sacredness at the heart of things at this period of life. If the young once have an experience of loving God, or duty, or truth, with intensity and passion, it not only performs a larger mental sphere but is an alterative of degraded love and inebriation. If the sole function of belief were to keep the heart strong, warm, and healthy, and prevent it from growing pessimistic, indifferent, decadent, it would make for virtue, which to be pure must be passionate at first. The best thing about *real* youth is that it will not devote itself to anything it feels to be trivial, insincere, or of anything but the highest worth and interest.

Moral inculcation in a democracy like ours should be based not on tradition but upon human nature. It alone is true and everything else is good and true in exact proportion as it squares with and helps to unfold it. It should begin with the body, with regimen, hygiene, and physical training. In athletic enthusiasm lie vast moral resources which the new higher anthropology is just beginning to see how to develop. The æsthetic elements of reverence, love of nature, art—not for art's sake—a bastard offspring of science—but for goodness' sake, fields for training in unselfish activity, impregnation with the germs of manifold reforms, a little inebriation with ideals,—something like this which cannot be marked or examined on should come next. Later and on such a basis should come the cooler survey of the great moral forces that rule the world and some more detailed study of personal, social and political duties. Nothing throughout the entire educational system should take precedence of this, which should give tone to it from bottom to top. I grow more fearful of intricating the plain natural sense of right and wrong by speculative ethical subtleties;—a method that originated with other races and ethnic stocks to meet very different needs and times from our own. I have taught these things long myself, but have come to believe our ancestors were right and did not overestimate this need in any department of our national or private life. If knowledge does not make for virtue, better idyllic ignorance of even the belauded invention of Cadmus. This unique American problem of ethical training we must work out for ourselves, and with the new scientific reënforcements now at hand I am optimist enough to believe we shall find or make a way to do it.

The third and last field, that of psychology, which was opened, as we have seen, at Yale, with Edwards and Berkeley, can be here treated very briefly. As Berkeley's problem widened into Hume's scepticism and that went on to Kant and the heroic age of German philosophy, American professors drew back. The Scotch philosophy represented by Reid, Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton, opened a far safer way. The "common sense," which was its watchword, contained an immediate conviction of right and wrong, of the reality of the external world, freedom, etc., about which there was no need or warrant for debate or doubt, while its discussion of association, desire, will, and feeling, was lucidity itself, and fitted our practical country and had a wider vogue here than in Scotland itself. In this form psychology was very widely introduced in American colleges. Its right or conservative wing, still represented at Princeton by Ex-President McCosh, has a good deal of claim to bear the title he gives it of the American philosophy. It has no quarrel with religion, is not unsettling, is full of stimulus to the young, and opens but does not close the mind against future growth. Its left wing, represented by John Stuart Mill, and which has since his death sought to make common cause with the positivism of Comte, has celebrated but few academic triumphs in this country.

Here, too, belongs the eclecticism of Cousin, early translated and first used as a text-book in Philadelphia.

A very different root of modern psychology is traced in the transcendental movement, the germs of which came from Kant, Herder, Goethe, Schelling, Fichte, Jacobi, and others through Coleridge. This marvellous movement may well be compared to the Platonic movement in ancient Greece in that it was a sudden diversion from all previous and indigenous thought and not essentially national. Although it began and ended in less than two decades here, it was the American equivalent of the entire period of German idealism, no feature of which is wanting in the American miniature. God was resolved into nature, nature into man, and, more lately, man into the consciousness of the present moment only to be re-evolved. We are spirits bathing in a sea of deity—man is an embryo God. Plato's ingenuous youth Thealætus had a less voracious appetite for the "boiled cobwebs" of solipsistic speculation than the academic would-be adepts in these times. Transcendentalism itself never entered the regular academic course save in a very adumbrated way in the text-books of Hickock, but was amazingly fructifying, and is yet, from without. It had marvellous power of enfranchisement and quickened the intellectual life of the country as no other movement has yet done. Years after it had passed, there grew up, in connection with a new interest in the history of philosophy, in St. Louis, around William T. Harris, a group of active minded idealists who sought to do over again the transcendental movement with more detail and with greater fidelity to its Teutonic sources. The Concord Summer School was an abortive attempt to graft the new western movement upon the dead transcendental stock. The cry back to Kant led here, as in England and Germany, to growing academic interest in what is called the "theory of knowledge," or the doctrine of reality, which has lately found a stronghold in several of our leading colleges and universities. It exercises a strange fascination over the minds of young men at that period when serious questions about existence, *ego*, soul, etc., first flit through every mind. Its method is introspective and it is open to all the dangers of introverted mental habits. It is as barren of what Bacon called fruits as the speculations or "final cause" which he condemned. If it gives limberness and flexibility to the mind, it wages eternal war against everything that is naïve, instinctive and spontaneous. It is un-American in origin and anti-American in spirit.

The last psychological departure, although it goes back to the days of Abercrombie, Rush, etc., began with the establishment of the first laboratory for experimental psychology in Baltimore in 1881. Something had been done in these lines previously in Germany, but the time was ripe and the soil fertile. It is already represented in two-score of the best institutions. It reduces introspection to a perfectly controlled system by means of suitable apparatus; has already a voluminous literature; several hundred standard new experiments; and offers to-day, an unsurpassed training in applied logic. It studies the instincts of animals from the highest to the lowest, and finds them both as diverse and with as fixed and characteristic traits as the anatomical structure. It shows how the highest intuitions of reason and conscience are rooted in the lowest animal instincts and are thus in little danger of collapse if external authoritative supports are removed. It studies the myths, customs, and beliefs of primitive man, and is giving the wide field of anthropology due academic scope and influence. It devotes itself to the study of insanity and nervous diseases, and has already begun to introduce new methods and utilize new results. It has a special department of neurology for exploiting all the properties of brain, nerve, and sense, and the field of its practical application is as wide as education in its largest philosophical sense. As we have seen, it has transformed and shaped the problems of logic and ethics; is slowly re-writing the whole history of philosophy, and, in the opinion of many of its more sanguine devotees, is showing itself not only to be the long hoped for, long delayed science of man, to which all other sciences are bringing their ripest and best thoughts, but is introducing a period that will be known hereafter as the psychological era of scientific thought, even more than a few recent decades have been marked by evolution. It has not yet overcome all prejudices, but has already begun to rebase religion, the moral and social instincts, as well as education, upon deeper as well as more ineluctable foundations. No academic activity has ever appeared so directly in the line of all that is most national in our intellectual development. It is asking the old question, what is man, in many new ways, and giving, bit by bit, new and deeper answers in a way that I deem it not too much to say makes every prospect of our own national future and of the republican type of government generally, brighter, and promises to be a realization of all that the old professors of logic, ethics, and religion, in their best days, dimly strove for,—and more.

NOTE.—Valuable suggestions of additional sources of information and new data have been kindly sent by Rev. Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, and especially by Rev. Dr. George E. Ellis, which I have had no time to utilize in the present article, but shall incorporate later in a much fuller treatment of the subject which is contemplated. G. S. H.

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NOTE.—Although I have been many years engaged upon this bibliography, I am well aware that it is not complete. Its greatest defect is the lack of the Christian names of the authors in many cases. Not a few of these have been supplied with much care and pains by Miss Mary Robinson, of the Library of the American Antiquarian Society, to whom I am glad hereby to acknowledge my obligations. G. S. H.

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